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This paper studies the provision of firm-sponsored general training in the presence of 
workers’ career concerns. We use a model building on the argument that the acquisition of 
general skills increases the worker’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the employer. In this 
context, we show that the worker’s implicit incentives to provide effort increase with the 
level of acquired general training. The employer takes this reciprocal effect into account 
and is thus more willing to invest in general human capital in the first place. When the 
positive effect of training on worker’s incentives is strong enough, the equilibrium 
outcome may even involve overinvestment in general training. It is also shown that a 
sharper increase in worker’s power associated with additional training may strengthen the 
employer’s investment incentives and have beneficial effects on welfare.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper studies the provision of firm-sponsored general training in the presence of 
workers’ career concerns
1. The exploration of this issue is largely motivated by the 
contrast between the theoretical recognition of efficiency benefits associated with the 
acquisition of general human capital and the ambiguous empirical evidence related to 
firm-sponsored investment in general skills. Indeed, there is much recent work arguing in 
favor of extensive training that should be directed towards general (rather than firm-
specific) capacities which improve organizational performance by enabling workers to 
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1 General training refers to human capital investment that increases the worker’s productivity to the same 
extent when the latter stays with her current employer as when she moves to another firm (or even forms her 
own firm).   2
engage in innovative or entrepreneurial activities
2. However, evidence reveals a rather 
contradictory actual pattern of skill development. In fact, there seems to be a process of 
polarization under way: Firms in countries like the United States or the United Kingdom 
tend to underinvest in employees’ general training relative, for example, to Japanese 
firms
3. We use a model of general training incorporating workers’ career concerns to 
provide an explanation for these differences. 
 
In his seminal work on the provision of general human capital, Becker (1964) assumes a 
perfectly competitive labor market. The current employer initially chooses the level of 
general training provided to the worker. Then, firms compete with each other by making 
wage offers to attract the trained worker. Finally, production takes place (with the 
worker’s productivity being positively related to the level of prior investment in general 
human capital). In this setting, the worker reaps all productivity benefits associated with 
general training due to competitive wage offers in labor market. In turn, the employer 
anticipates that he will not be able to recoup the costs of his initial investment and thus 
optimally chooses to make zero investment in the first place.  
 
In the face of empirical evidence showing that employers do invest in their employees’ 
general skills (see e.g. Krueger, 1993; Autor, 1998; Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, 1999a; 
Booth and Bryan, 2002), a more recent branch of the related literature has studied the 
conditions under which firms are indeed willing to pay for their workers’ general human 
capital. A number of studies made by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2003) 
has concluded that positive firm-sponsored investment requires that the labor market is 
frictional (rather than perfectly competitive) and the marginal effect of training on 
productivity exceeds the marginal effect of training on worker’s wage (i.e. there must be 
some degree of ‘wage compression’)
4. When these conditions hold, the firm’s investment 
will be positive but still inefficiently low relative to the first-best. The reason for 
underinvestment is that a higher level of general training increases the worker’s outside 
                                                 
2 See Pfeffer (1998) for an extensive discussion on benefits associated with this kind of ‘people-centered 
management’. 
3 It is a noteworthy fact that Japanese firms provide 364 hours of training to new workers in the first six 
months of employment, while US firms firms only provide 42 hours on average (Pfeffer, 1998, p. 85-90).  
4 Similar arguments have been raised by Katz and Ziderman (1990) or Chang and Wang (1996), who 
assume that investment is not observable by other potential employers. More recent contributions on the 
subject of general training include Booth and Zoega (2000, 2004), Gersbach and Schmultzer (2003) or 
Balmaceda (2005, 2008).   3
wage, implying that the current employer has to pay a higher wage in order to keep the 
worker from moving to another firm. Furthermore, any increase in the worker’s 
bargaining power implies a lower level of firm-sponsored investment (since it allows the 
worker to reap a larger share of productivity benefits associated with training) and thus 
reduces social welfare. 
 
All the above studies seek to account for underinvestment (which is broadly consistent 
with evidence related to countries like the UK and the USA) but rule out the possibility of 
overinvestment in general human capital. Therefore, they cannot explain the exceptionally 
high levels of training observed in other cases (e.g. in Japanese firms)
5. We develop a 
model that incorporates workers’ career concerns and takes power considerations into 
account to provide a more unified framework explaining both underinvestment and 
overinvestment in general training
6. The model assumes that the provision of general 
capacities shifts the balance of bargaining power within the organization. In particular, 
workers who receive more extensive general training strengthen their bargaining position 
vis-à-vis their employer and thus can extract a higher proportion of the produced surplus 
in future periods. This assumption usually implies that the employer rationally provides 
inefficiently low levels of general training in order to secure his power in the long-run
7. 
We show, however, that this result does not necessarily hold in the presence of workers’ 
career concerns.  
 
The literature on career concerns starts with Fama (1980), who argued that workers-
managers’ career concerns provide them with implicit incentives that motivate high levels 
of effort even in the absence of explicit agency contracts. This idea has been formalized 
                                                 
5 Different patterns of training between Japanese and US firms have also been studied by Owan (2004) in 
the context of asymmetric learning about workers’ characteristics. 
6 The question of power in the context of career concerns has also been studied by Ortega (2003) in a model 
of team production. However, Ortega’s conceptualization of power is entirely different from the one 
adopted in our model. In particular, he assumes that power is captured by the marginal effect of effort on 
firm’s performance. This means that power does not confer any direct material benefits to workers-
managers, contrasting the assumptions made here.  
7 This argument has been formulated by Wright (2004). Similarly, Marglin (1974) has argued that power 
(rather than efficiency) considerations may explain the evolution of organizational practices within the 
workplace. In particular, hierarchical work organization and extensive specialization might be viewed as a 
kind of divide-and-conquer strategy adopted by employers in order to secure their role in the production 
process as integrators of workers’ individual efforts into marketable products. In the same context, Gindin 
(1998) claims that employers are more willing to make concessions at the level of wages than to pay for 
employees’ general training because the widespread development of workers’ general capacities for creative 
planning and decision-making would generate a far more decisive shift in the balance of class forces than a 
direct increase of workers’ purchasing power.   4
by Holmstrom (1982; 1999) in a multi-period model where there is symmetric (but 
imperfect) information about the worker’s ability and, at the same time, the worker’s 
effort is nonverifiable (i.e. there is moral hazard). Under the assumption that commitment 
to a long-term contract is not possible, the employer makes a wage offer to the worker at 
the beginning of each period. Since the wage offer is contingent on the expected output of 
the respective period (given the history of past output realizations), the worker has an 
incentive to work harder in early periods so as to raise market beliefs about her ability, 
thus increasing the expected output and wage offers to be received in future periods
8. 
 
The two-period model developed below studies the firm’s incentives to provide general 
training in the presence of worker’s career concerns. In the first period, the employer 
initially chooses the level of investment in general human capital. Next, the employer 
makes a wage offer to the worker according to the specified structure of the labor market. 
Then, the worker chooses her (nonverifiable) effort contribution and the first-period 
output is produced. All agents’ beliefs about the worker’s ability are updated given the 
realization of first-period output (which is observable by all agents). The acquisition of 
general skills increases the worker’s productivity and, furthermore, increases the worker’s 
bargaining power vis-à-vis the employer in the second period. This shift in the balance of 
power is reflected in the new wage offer: A higher level of general skills acquired in the 
first period implies that the worker can extract a higher share of the second-period 
expected output. After the new wage has been determined, the worker chooses her new 
effort contribution and the second-period output is realized. 
 
In this framework, it is shown that the worker’s implicit incentives to contribute effort in 
the first period increase with the level of general training provided by the firm. The 
employer anticipates this positive effect of training on worker’s incentives and is thus 
willing to invest in general human capital with higher intensity. In fact, when this positive 
impact on worker’s incentives is strong enough, the employer may even overinvest 
(relative to the first-best) in equilibrium. Furthermore, it is shown that a higher level of 
worker’s power (associated with an additional unit of training) may enhance the 
                                                 
8 Further contributions on the issue of career concerns include Gibbons and Murphy (1992) or Andersson 
(2002), who study the interaction between career concerns and explicit incentives optimally designed in an 
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Dewatripont et al (1999).   5
employer’s investment incentives, due to the anticipated positive impact of this 
investment on worker’s incentives. This result is in contrast with the usual prediction that 
any increase in the worker’s bargaining power has a negative impact on firm’s investment 
incentives. Turning to welfare implications, we study the socially optimal level of 
worker’s power and identify conditions under which initial increases in worker’s power 
are welfare-enhancing. More precisely, it is shown that a zero level of power can be 
optimal only if the worker’s average ability is high enough. In all other cases, there is an 
inverse-U relationship between power and welfare: Initial increases in worker’s power 
enhance social welfare, whereas further increases above a critical level of power will be 
detrimental to welfare. A series of numerical examples is used to illustrate these results.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the basic model is introduced; 
Section 3 involves the computation of the first-best outcome, while Section 4 deals with 
the derivation of equilibrium in the second-best environment. The positive implications of 
equilibrium are explored in Section 5, whereas welfare implications are investigated in 
Section 6. Finally, Section 7 discusses possible extensions as well as policy implications 
and Section 8 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2. The Model 
We consider a two-period model. We assume that there is one worker A in the economy, 
one current employer P and many potential employers who are identical with P. On the 
other hand, there is a consumption good x which is produced in each period according to 
the technology specified below. The worker contributes effort αt to the production of the 
consumption good in each period (t =1, 2). Finally, we denote by I the level of investment 
in general skills. The cost of this investment is paid by the employer in the first period, 
whereas future benefits are realized in the form of increased second-period worker 
productivity. In particular, we assume the following production technology: 
11 1 xn aε =+ +         :  Output in the first period 
22 2 x na I ε =+ + + : Output in the second period 
where n denotes  the worker’s innate ability,  [0, ) t a ∈ +∞  is the level of effort contributed 
by the worker in period t and εt is an idiosyncratic productivity shock. The level of effort 
αt is nonverifiable - i.e. there is moral hazard. The output xt in each period is observable   6
by all agents in the economy. Furthermore, we assume that n and εt  are normally 
distributed: 
•  00 ~(, 1 /) nN m h : Distribution of worker’s innate ability
9.  
•  ~( 0 , 1 /) t Nh ε ε : Distribution of the productivity shock in period t. 
The random variables n, ε1 and ε2 are (identically and) independently distributed: 
•  12 1 2 cov( , ) cov( , ) cov( , ) 0 nn ε εεε ===  
The agents’ preferences are represented by the following (expected) utility functions: 
2
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β =− Ι +:  P’s lifetime discounted expected utility, 
where 
i
t x  denotes agent i’s consumption ( {,} iA P ∈ ) in period t and  [0,1] β ∈  is the 
(common) discount factor. The disutility of labor provided in each period is represented 
by the function 
2 () / 2 tt ga ρα =  (with ρ>0), while the cost of investment in general 
training is captured by the cost function
2 () / 2 II τθ =  (with θ>0).  
 
3. The First-Best Outcome 
Since all agents’ preferences are represented by quasilinear utility functions, the 
optimality problem involves the maximization of total surplus (sum of utilities) subject to 
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Equivalently, the above problem can be written: 
                                                 
9 The model assumes that beliefs about n (represented by the above distribution) are symmetric – i.e. they 
are shared by all agents in the economy. 
  : Resource Constraints 
: Technological Constraints   7
1,2
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The solution of this problem is: 
12 1/
FB FB FB aaa ρ ===, /
FB β θ Ι=                                                                                      
yielding the first-best level of welfare: 
22
0 (1 ) (1 )[ ( ) ] ( )
22
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ββ α β =+ ++ − + −  
 
4. The Second-Best Outcome: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
 
In order to find the equilibrium in our second-best environment, we must define the 
structure of the labor market. Since there is no possibility of commitment to a long-term 
contract, the employer makes a wage offer at the beginning of each period. The wage 
offer is contingent on the expected output of the respective period given the history of past 
output realizations (implying that there exist implicit incentives – i.e. career concerns – 
for the worker to provide effort). In particular, we assume the following wage structure 
(where wt denotes the wage offer at the beginning of period t): 
11 (/ ) wk E x p r i o r = , [0,1] k∈                                                                                            ( 1 ) 
 The term 1-k represents the employer’s ex-ante monopsony power. Of course, if k=1 the 
labor market is perfectly competitive and the worker receives her full (marginal) 
productivity; this extreme case replicates the assumption in Becker’s seminal model. It is 
already known by the related literature (and it will also be made clear below) that a 
frictional (imperfect) labor market (k<1) is a necessary condition for the employer to have 
any incentive to make a positive investment in general human capital.  For the second 
period wage offer, we assume the following structure: 
22 1 min{ ,1} ( / ) ,  0 wk I E x x δ δ =+ ⋅ ≥                                                                               ( 2 )  
The implicit assumption here is that the worker’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the employer 
in the second period increases with the level of general training received in the first 
period. This reflects the argument that the provision of general training shifts the balance 
of power in favor of workers. Due to the very nature of general training, the worker’s 
(second-period) outside wage opportunity increases with the level of training received in 
the first period. This implies that the current employer must pay a higher second-period 
wage to keep the worker. This reasoning is depicted in the wage structure specified above.   8
The parameter δ represents the increase in worker’s second-period bargaining power (or 
the second-period wage premium) associated with an additional unit of general human 
capital. The crucial question is how this wage structure affects the worker’s incentives to 
provide effort as well as the employer’s investment incentives. 
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The timing of the associated game is the following: 
 
•  Period 1 (t=1) 
1. P chooses the level of investment in general training I. 
2. P offers  11 (/ ) wk E x p r i o r =  to A according to the wage structure specified in (1). 
3. A chooses her first-period effort contribution α1 and output x1 is realized. 
4. All agents update their beliefs about A’s ability given the first-period output realization. 
•  Period 2 (t=2) 
1. P offers w2 according to the wage structure specified in (2). 
2. A chooses her second-period effort contribution α2 and output x2 is realized. 
The equilibrium concept which must be used here is the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 
(PBE). In particular, the equilibrium outcome consists of strategies
***
12 (,,) aI α , 
conjectures  12 (, ) aa  and beliefs about the worker’s ability such that: 
(i)  A’s strategy 
**
12 (,) aa maximizes her expected payoff. 
(ii)  P’s strategy 
* I  maximizes his expected payoff. 
(iii)  Conjectures are correct: 
**
12 12 (, )(, ) aa aa =  
(iv)  Beliefs about the worker’s ability are derived from Bayes’ rule given 
equilibrium strategies. 
We use backward induction to compute the equilibrium outcome. In the second period, 
the worker A chooses her effort contribution α2 (given I, w1, α1 and w2) so as to maximize 
her expected payoff: 
2
22
11 22 {} max ( )
22
A a EU w w
ρ ρ
α βα =− + −  
Of course, the (Kuhn-Tucker) first order conditions imply the solution: 
 
*
2 0 a =                                                                                                                              ( 3 )   9
Since the worker is motivated only by her career concerns, it is clear that she has no 
incentive to provide any effort at all in the last period of the interaction. 
Anticipating the worker’s rational behavior in the second period (
*
2 0 a = ), the employer 
makes the second-period wage offer (given I, w1, α1) according to the wage structure 
specified in (2): 
21 2 1 1 ( ) min{ ,1} ( / ) min{ ,1} [ ( / )] wx k I E x x k I I E nx δ δ =+ ⋅ =+ ⋅ +                                    ( 4 ) 
Given the output realization x1, all agents’ beliefs about the worker’s ability are updated at 
the end of the first period. We define a new random variable: 
111 111 1 zxan a an ε ε ≡ − =+ + − =+, which is also normally distributed since n and ε1 are 
normally distributed (note that  11 aa =  along the equilibrium path). Therefore, we can use 
the following normal updating formula associated with two normally distributed random 
variables y1, y2: 
22 12
12 1 2 2 1 2
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We have:
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                                                               ( 7 ) 
Anticipating w2(x1) in (7) and 
*
2 0 a = , the worker chooses her effort contribution in the 
first period (given I, w1) so as to maximize her expected payoff: 
1
2* 2
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                                                                                         ( 8 ) 
Note that (for (1 ) / Ik δ ≤− ) the worker’s implicit incentives are strengthened when she 
receives more training by the employer in the first place. This happens because higher 
training implies that the worker has a larger share in the second-period expected output 
and thus has stronger incentives to raise market beliefs about her ability by working 














In other words, the worker reciprocates the firm’s willingness to provide her with general 
training by increasing her own willingness to work for the employer in the first period. 
This kind of reciprocal behavior is confirmed by field evidence
10. It should also be 
emphasized that this reciprocal effect of firm-sponsored training on worker’s incentives is 
not the result of any behavioral assumption stipulating reciprocal preferences for the 
worker (as in Leuven et al, 2002). 
The first-period wage is calculated (anticipating the worker’s choice of α1) according to 
the wage structure specified in (1): 
11 0 1 (/ ) ( ) wk E x p r i o rk ma == +                                                                                        ( 9 ) 
where α1 is given in (8). 
At the first stage of the game, the employer P chooses the level of investment in general 
training I (anticipating w1, α1, w2, α2 as given in (9), (8), (7), (3) respectively) so as to 
maximize his lifetime expected payoff: 
2
11 22 {} max { ( )}
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10 For example, Pfeffer (1998, p.89) refers to the case of Taco Inc (a private manufacturer with 450 
employees) offering “astonishing educational opportunities” to its employees in an on-site learning center. 
When the company’s chief executive John Haze White was asked to put a monetary value on the returns 
from operating the center (which had a high cost for the firm to build and, furthermore, implies significant 
direct expenses and lost production costs every year), he said: “It comes back in the form of attitude. People 
feel they are playing in the game – not being kicked around in it” (emphasis added).   11
For (1 )/ Ik δ ≥− , we have:  / 0 P EU I I θ ∂∂ = − < . This means that the employer’s 
investment will never be higher than(1 )/ k δ − . Consequently, we focus on the interval 
0( 1 ) / Ik δ ≤≤−  and solve the problem: 
2
01 0 {} max (1 )( ) ( )(1 )
2
P I EU k m a m I k I
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β δ =− + −Ι + + −−  
s.t. 0 (1 )/ Ik δ ≤≤−  
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The FOCs are: 
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The first term represents the employer’s marginal benefit of investment in terms of 
worker’s increased first-period effort. The second term is the direct marginal cost of 
investment. The third term is the marginal benefit in terms of increased second-period 
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The employer anticipates the positive impact of general training on worker’s first-period 
incentives and takes this effect into account when choosing I in the first place. Therefore, 
the employer is willing to invest in general human capital with higher intensity because he 
predicts the positive effect of investment on worker’s effort contribution α1. This 
interaction between the worker’s incentives to provide effort and the employer’s 
investment incentives provides an additional rationale (which has not been taken into 
account so far in the associated literature) for firm-sponsored general training.   12
Note that  *0 I =  when k=1: This case corresponds to Becker’s prediction that the firm 
will make zero investment if there are no frictions in the labor market (i.e. if the labor 
market is perfectly competitive). 
The equilibrium outcome is summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium involves: 
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        The equilibrium welfare is: 
        
** 2 * * 2
01 1 *( 1 ) () ()
22
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5. Implications 
5.1 The Impact of Power on Investment and Effort 
The negative relationship between mo and I* (which is depicted in Figure 1) is contingent 
on the specific production technology assumed here – i.e. on perfect substitutability 
between innate ability n and investment in general human capital. Some other 
comparative statics results are easy to understand. Equilibrium investment decreases with 
k (i.e. investment decreases as the labor market becomes more competitive) and increases 
with the discount factor β. Furthermore, a decrease in ρ or ho as well as an increase in hε 
increase investment, because they imply a stronger positive impact of I on worker’s first-
period effort. The employer takes this effect into account and thus has an incentive to 
invest with higher intensity.  
We proceed to study the effect of worker’s power (captured by the parameter δ) on 
employer’s investment incentives. To this end, we rewrite the equilibrium level of training 
as a function of δ. After the appropriate calculations (which can be found in the Appendix 
A), we find: 
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For the parameter interval where I*=IH, it is obvious that */ 0 I δ ∂ ∂<. For the intervals 
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            ( 10 ) 
The first term in (10) is the direct negative effect of worker’s power on employer’s 
incentives to invest in general training, since a higher value of δ reduces the employer’s 















) associated with the fact that a higher value of δ implies 
a stronger positive effect of training on worker’s incentives and thus makes the firm more 
willing to invest in general human capital. If this positive effect is stronger than the direct 
negative effect, then the overall impact of worker’s power on employer’s investment 
incentives will be positive. In particular, we can find the results summarized in the next 
proposition: 
   14
 Proposition 2. 
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(see Figure 3) 




























) for all  0 δ δ <   
(see Figure 4) 
 
Proof: See Appendix B. 
 
The comparative statics analysis for case 1a shows that a higher level of worker’s power 
(up to a threshold value δ2) increases the employer’s incentives to invest in general 
training. In particular, this happens when the worker’s expected ability is low enough. 
This result contrasts the predictions of previous studies, according to which any increase 
in worker’s power weakens the employer’s investment incentives.  
 
We can also derive the effect of worker’s power δ on first-period equilibrium effort. First, 
we write down 
*
1 a  derived above as a function of δ: 
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                                                                                     (14) 
The first term in the parenthesis is the direct positive effect of power on worker’s 
incentives associated with the higher share extracted by the worker in the second period. 
However, the second term can be either positive or negative depending on the overall 
impact of δ on employer’s investment incentives (as described in Proposition 2). 
Equation (14) implies the following result: 


















Clearly, if an increase in worker’s power has a positive impact on employer’s investment 
incentives, then it surely increases the worker’s first-period implicit incentives to provide 
effort, too. On the other hand, if the overall impact of power on equilibrium training is 
negative, then the sign of 
*
1 / a δ ∂∂  is ambiguous. The appropriate calculations yield the 
following result: 
Proposition 3.  
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(see Figure 5) 
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(see Figure 6) 
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(see Figure 7) 
                                                 
11 Clearly, we have 
*
1 /0 a δ ∂∂ =  for all other parameter intervals.   16
 
Proof: See Appendix C. 
 
Note that when the worker’s expected ability is high enough (case 2), any increase in 
worker’s power above a critical value δ4 implies a negative impact on employer’s 
investment incentives ( */ 0 I δ ∂∂ < ) so strong that it also pushes worker’s first-period 
incentives downward (
*
1 /0 a δ ∂∂ < ). 
 
5.2 The Possibility of Overinvestment in General Training 
 
In previous models studying the issue of general training, a common prediction is that the 
employer underinvests in general human capital (relative to the first-best) in equilibrium. 
In this subsection, we show that equilibrium is compatible with overinvestment under 
certain conditions. From the comparative statics analysis conducted above, it is clear that 
overinvestment can arise only in case 1a. To see this, note first that  ˆ *
FB I II =<  when 
δ=0. Furthermore, in cases 1b and 2 any increase of worker’s power δ reduces equilibrium 
investment further below the first-best level, implying that underinvestment is always the 
case. Therefore, we focus on case 1a (where investment in training increases with 
worker’s power in the interval 2 δ δ < ) to examine the possibility of overinvestment. In 
particular, we can state the following proposition: 
 













then equilibrium involves overinvestment in general training (I* >I
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Proof: See Appendix D. 
The case of overinvestment is depicted in Figure 8. 
 
The driving force of overinvestment is precisely the positive effect of general training on 
worker’s first-period incentives to provide effort. As already noted, the employer takes 
this effect into account and is thus willing to provide general skills with higher intensity. 
If the positive effect on worker’s incentives is strong enough, then the employer’s 
investment incentives can be excessively strong.   17
 
Note that overinvestment by the employer requires that the worker’s expected innate 
ability m0 is sufficiently small. This is fairly intuitive in our framework, since training and 
innate ability are perfect substitutes in the production function. Of course, the opposite 
(i.e. overinvestment for high values of expected innate ability) might be the case if the 
production technology assumed that general human capital and innate ability are 
complements. Furthermore, it should be noted that the case of overinvestment arises for 
intermediate values of worker’s power ( 56 δ δδ < < ). To the contrary, underinvestment is 
always the case for both too low and too high values of δ. If the worker’s power is very 
small (δ < δ5), then the employer anticipates that his investment will not have a very 
strong positive effect on worker’s first-period incentives; as a result, the employer does 
not invest much. On the other hand, if the worker is too strong ( 6 δ δ > ) then the firm’s 
investment incentives are again pushed below the optimum (note that, in this case, even a 
small level of investment implies that the worker enjoys the full second-period expected 
output). Therefore, the model predicts that overinvestment can take place only for 
intermediate values of worker’s power.  
 
It is well-known that long-term employment is a distinct characteristic of the Japanese 
employment system. In terms of our model, this means that workers in Japanese firms 
have relatively strong implicit incentives to provide effort in early periods of their career. 
In terms of the model developed here, the positive impact of these strong career concerns 
on employers’ investment incentives may explain the high levels of training typically 
observed in Japanese firms.  
 
6. Welfare Analysis 
In Proposition 1, we have stated the equilibrium level of welfare: 
** 2 * * 2
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22
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The above equation shows that the overall impact of power on welfare is the sum of two 
separate effects: First, the effect of power on worker’s first-period incentives; and second, 
the effect of power on employer’s investment incentives. These two effects can work   18
either in the same or in opposite directions (in the latter case, the total impact of worker’s 
power on welfare is ambiguous). We are interested in finding the optimal level of power 
(in the sense of welfare maximization). It will be made clear that a zero level of power is 
socially optimal only for a limited range of parameters, while in all other cases the 
optimization problem has an interior solution. This also contrasts previous models of 
general training, where any increase in worker’s power is detrimental to welfare. We 
study each parameter interval separately first: 
























 , then we have: 












δδ δ + +
++
∂ ∂∂
=− + − >
∂∂ ∂
 
In words: Initial increases in worker’s power enhance welfare, since they imply a more 
efficient (higher) first-period effort choice by the worker as well as a more efficient (higher) 


















, which can be either positive or 
negative. In this interval, equilibrium involves overinvestment and any increase in worker’s 
power (up to δ2) keeps pushing the level of training further above the optimum. This effect 
is now detrimental to welfare but coexists with the positive effect of power on worker’s 
implicit incentives. As a result, the overall impact on welfare is ambiguous. 


















In this interval, a further increase in worker’s power has again an unambiguously positive 
effect on welfare, because it implies a lower (i.e. closer to the first-best) level of investment 
in training, while the worker’s incentives remain unaffected. 
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As the worker’s power increases very much, the overall impact on welfare becomes 
negative, since the employer’s investment falls again below the optimum and keeps falling 
to more and more inefficiently low levels (while the worker’s incentives remain unaffected).   19
Note that δ=δ6 is a local (and potentially global) welfare maximizer in this case. 
We proceed in the same way to examine the other parameter intervals (in which equilibrium 
always involves underinvestment).  
(ii) If  0
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Note that δ=δ2 is the socially optimal level of worker’s power in this case. 











, then we have: 

















 which can be either positive or negative. 
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The above results show that a zero level of worker’s power is a possible welfare 
maximizer only in cases 1b and 2. On the contrary, the welfare maximizing level of power 
is always positive (and bounded) in case 1a.    20
In order to derive more precise results, we write down the general welfare maximization 
problem for the parameter intervals where  0 *( ) / ( 2 ) IR m βδβ δ θ = −+  (i.e. for δ<δ2 in 
case 1 and for δ<δ0 in case 2)
12. Defineδ as follows: 





















 (case 2).  
Then, we must solve the following maximization problem: 
** 2 2
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The solution of this problem allows us to state the following proposition: 
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 i.e. only if the worker’s expected innate ability is high enough.  
 
Proof: See Appendix E.              
This is a necessary condition for δ=0 to be a welfare maximizer. When this condition 
holds, there is always underinvestment in general human capital and, furthermore, any 
initial increase in worker’s power weakens the employer’s investment incentives – thus 
pushing I* further below the optimum. When this negative impact on welfare dominates 
the positive impact associated with the worker’s stronger incentives to provide effort in 
the first period, then any initial increase in worker’s power above δ=0 will be detrimental 
to welfare. 
 
Finally, Proposition 5 along with the overall welfare analysis implies the following result: 
 
Proposition 6. If  0 * mm < , then there is a positive and bounded level of power δ* 
which maximizes social welfare.  
 
                                                 
12 Note that we have already found the sign of  */ W δ ∂ ∂  for δ>δ2 (case 1) or δ>δ0 (case 2).   21
In this case, initial increases in worker’s power up to a critical value δ* enhance welfare, 
whereas further increases above that critical value will be detrimental to welfare
13.  
We close the subsection related to the welfare analysis with some numerical examples, 
illustrating each of the different cases described above. 
 
 
6.1 Numerical Examples 
(i) Let 0 1 hh ε β ρ ==== ,  1/2 k = ,  0 0 m = ,  1 θ = . 
These parameter values correspond to case 1b (involving underinvestment for all values 
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The solution is 0 δ = . Since  */ 0 W δ ∂∂ <  for all 2 31 δδ >= + , a zero level of worker’s 
power maximizes equilibrium welfare in this case (i.e. δ*=0). Indeed, for these parameter 
values it can be directly verified that the condition stated in Proposition 5 holds. 
 
(ii) Let 0 1 hh ε β ρ ==== , 1/2 k = ,  0 0 m = ,  8 θ = .  
These parameter values correspond to case 1a-ii (again with underinvestment for all 










, if  2 17 1 δδ ≤= +  






I αδ =+, if  17 1 δ ≤+  
                                                 
13 It should be noted that a similar inverted U-shaped relationship between workers’ power and efficiency 
has also been pointed out in a broader context by Wright (2000).   22
*
1 1/2 α = , if  17 1 δ ≥+     , and:  1/8
FB I = ,  1
FB a = .  
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The solution now is 2 17 1 δδ == + . Since */ 0 W δ ∂ ∂< for all δ>δ2, the optimal level of 
power is  2 *1 7 1 δδ == +   as already predicted above for the general case. 
 
(iii) Let 0 1 hh ε β ρ ==== , 1/2 k = ,  0 0 m = , 16 θ = . 
These parameter values correspond to case 1a-i, with overinvestment for 56 δ δδ <<. The 
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I αδ =+, if  33 1 δ ≤+  
*
1 1/2 α = , if  33 1 δ ≥+                               and: 1/16
FB I = ,  1
FB a = ,  5 4 δ = ,  6 8 δ =  
In this case, there is overinvestment in equilibrium for 56 δ δδ < < , i.e. for 4<δ<8. 




max *( ) ( ) * 8( *)
2
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δ δ =− +−  
s.t. 03 3 1 δ ≤≤ +  
The solution now is 2 33 1 δδ == + . Since  */ 0 W δ ∂ ∂> for  26 8 δ δδ << =  and 
*/ 0 W δ ∂∂ <  for 6 8 δ δ >= , the social welfare is maximized for 6 *8 δ δ = = . 
Note that the condition (16) is not satisfied in examples (ii) and (iii), implying that δ=0 
cannot be a welfare maximizer in either of these cases. 
 
7. Policy Implications and Possible Extensions 
A standard question often addressed in the literature concerns the appropriate policy 
instrument or the optimal degree of public intervention in order to alleviate inefficiencies 
associated with incentives to invest in general training. In this respect, the prediction of 
underinvestment (which is common in all previous studies) by the employer implies that a   23
government subsidy to the firm is the appropriate policy measure to strengthen the firm’s 
investment incentives and enhance social welfare
14. However, the framework adopted 
here shows that this is not necessarily the appropriate policy recommendation. The 
possibility of overinvestment in human capital implies that a subsidy to the firm may push 
the level of training further above the optimum and thus have a detrimental effect on 
welfare. On the other hand, such an additional increase in general training may also 
motivate the employee to work harder in the first period. The overall impact of the 
subsidy on welfare will depend on the relative strength of these two opposite effects. Of 
course, if there is underinvestment in equilibrium then a subsidy to the firm is indeed 
recommended because it pushes the employer’s investment closer to the first-best and thus 
also strengthens the worker’s first-period incentives.  
 
In his seminal paper on general training, Becker suggested (in the context of a perfectly 
competitive labour market) that the worker herself should pay for general training because 
she faces the right incentives to invest efficiently in her own human capital. A possible 
extension of our paper is to check the validity of this claim within the framework adopted 
here. We can assume that the worker buys general human capital from a training company 
which sells general skills at an endogenously determined price. A welfare comparison 
between that regime and the one described here should take into account not only the 
amount of training but also the worker’s incentives to provide effort in each case. 
Furthermore, in the light of these two regimes one might also examine whether a 
government subsidy to the firm or a subsidy to the worker (a public system of training or 
education, for example) is a superior policy instrument in terms of welfare. Alternative 
policy measures such as marginal cost pricing can also be studied and evaluated.  
 
8. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have studied the provision of firm-sponsored general training when 
worker’s career concerns are taken into account. A crucial assumption has been that a 
higher level of general training in the first period shifts the balance of power in favour of 
workers and thus increases the latter’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the employer in the next 
period (in this sense, power can be interpreted here as the wage premium associated with 
an additional unit of general human capital). In this framework, it has been shown that a 
                                                 
14 A notable exception here is Moen and Rosen (2002).   24
higher investment in training raises the worker’s incentives to contribute effort in the first 
period. The employer takes this positive effect into account and is thus willing to invest in 
general training with higher intensity. If the positive effect of training on worker’s 
incentives is strong enough, then equilibrium can involve overinvestment in general 
human capital. In particular, the case of overinvestment can arise for intermediate values 
of worker’s bargaining power. In this context, initial increases in worker’s power up to a 
threshold value may strengthen the employer’s investment incentives and enhance 
welfare. These results show that predictions commonly found in previous studies 
(involving underinvestment in general human capital along with a negative impact of 
worker’s power on investment and welfare) might not hold in an enriched framework that 
takes workers’ implicit incentives into account.  
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The conditions (C1) and (C2) yield cases 1a, 1b in Proposition 3. 
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 which holds for all 0 δ δ < .                                     ( C4 ) 
The conditions (C3) and (C4) yield case 2 in Proposition 3. 
Appendix D. 
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(C1) cannot hold, i.e. there is underinvestment for all 2 δ δ <  (and thus for all 0 δ ≥ , since 
I*(δ) is decreasing in δ for δ>δ2). 
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Finally, note that δ2<δ6 implies 52 δ δ < .  
The conditions (D1) to (D4) yield the results summarized in Proposition 4.  
 
Appendix E. 
Note, first, that the welfare maximization problem is not (globally) concave with respect 
to δ. Therefore, we must find all (interior and boundary) solutions of first-order conditions 
and compare the value of the objective function at different solutions to find the 
maximum. 
The Lagrangian is: 
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We check if δ=0 can be a solution of FOCs. For δ=0 the conditions (E2) imply λ=0. In 
this case, (E1) requires: 
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We have:  0 2
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Figure 4: Case 2 

















Figure 6: Case 1b 
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